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INTRODUCTION
increased investment in large-scale agricultural, forestry, and fishing
projects1 has raised concerns about pressures on lands and natural
resources, and the negative impacts these investments can have when poorly
regulated and irresponsibly operated. new disputes between investors and
states concerning these investments have sparked commentary regarding
the potentially chilling effects they may have on effective regulation of inward
investment. At the same time, public and private investments in agriculture
are identified as global priorities in the sustainable Development goals.
Policy-makers are therefore seeking to facilitate investments in agriculture to
advance food security, nutrition, equality, climate and other sustainable
development objectives.

FOOTNOTES
1.

2 |
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Referred to collectively herein as “agricultural” investments.

AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS unDER inTERnATiOnAl invEsTmEnT lAW

International investment law plays an important role in
the governance of foreign investment, including
investment in agricultural industries. more than 3,300
investment treaties have been concluded, and over 2,500
such treaties are currently in force.2 The obligations
established by these treaties, and enforced by means of
investor–state arbitration, can present challenges for
policy-makers and others seeking to ensure that
investments are sustainable, including by affecting the
ways in which the costs and benefits of investments are
distributed among different actors.

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
TREATIES WITH INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
Bilateral investment treaties (BiTs) are
agreements concluded between two state
parties concerning the promotion and
protection of investment. Treaties with
investment provisions are agreements that
include provisions on the promotion and
protection of investment alongside provisions
concerning other issues. They can be bilateral
(concluded by two states) or multilateral
(concluded by more than two states). For
example, investment chapters are often found
within free trade agreements.

WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW?
international investment law is primarily based on
binding treaties between two or more states aimed at
protecting foreign investments in the host state. While the
content and scope of a specific investment treaty will vary
depending on the text of the agreement itself, treaties
commonly require that states treat foreign investors no
differently to national investors and no less favourably
than other foreign investors. states are often required to
compensate investors when they expropriate an
investment or adopt measures that may have a significant
impact on an investment (“indirect expropriation”). The
public purpose of a measure does not generally affect
whether compensation is due. importantly, treaties often
provide that states must treat foreign investors “fairly and
equitably,” an obligation generally left without any
additional guidance on its meaning.
in addition to these protections, treaties increasingly
include liberalization elements in the form of “preestablishment” obligations. Among other things, such
treaties disallow the use of so-called performance
requirements, and require that potential foreign investors
have the same access to markets as national investors.3

2.

last checked October 1, 2018. unCTAD, Investment Policy Hub,
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/iiA>. in most cases, investment
treaties must be ratified in order to become effective (i.e., come into force).
The text of the investment treaty itself will generally describe the acts or
measures required for a treaty to become effective.

WHO AND WHAT DO INVESTMENT
TREATIES PROTECT?
investment treaties are intended to protect “investors” of
one state party making “investments” in another state
party. in many cases, the “investor” will be the parent
company of a multinational enterprise, and the
“investment” will be its foreign subsidiary.
What constitutes a covered investment under a specific
treaty will vary according to the text of the agreement,
and states have adopted different approaches to
defining covered investments. in general, treaties tend to
define “investment” broadly, and most agricultural
projects are likely to be covered.

3.

For brief explanations of these treaty standards, see the glossary below,
starting at p. 12. see also lorenzo Cotula, “investment Treaties and sustainable
Development: investment liberalisation” (iiED Briefing, may 2014)
<http://pubs.iied.org/17239iiED/>.
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HOW ARE INVESTMENT
TREATIES ENFORCED?

WHY DOES THIS MATTER FOR
AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS?

most investment treaties, and many international
investment contracts, include a dispute settlement
provision allowing investors to bring claims against host
states directly before international arbitral tribunals
(also commonly referred to as a mechanism for
“investor–state dispute settlement,” or isDs). This
mechanism can enable foreign investors to bypass
domestic court systems, to bring parallel claims at the
same time as domestic court proceedings, or even to
challenge those proceedings. The final decisions of
investor–state arbitral tribunals (“awards”) are binding,
and they can generally be enforced in the domestic
courts of any state party to the Convention on the
settlement of investment Disputes between states and
nationals of Other states (iCsiD Convention)4 or the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (new York Convention),5
depending on the rules applicable to the arbitration. The
decisions of investment tribunals can be challenged only
on specific and very narrow grounds.

The number of known investor–state claims concerning
agricultural investments has grown in recent years, with
the number of disputes concerning agricultural
investments growing more rapidly since 2003.6 since
2004, at least one claim concerning these investments
has been initiated each year, with six cases initiated in
2010, and three in the first half of 2018 alone. The
majority of cases have been brought by investors from
high-income countries against low- or middle-income
country governments, with investors being awarded an
average of almost usD 100 million. According to the
unCTAD and iCsiD databases, the total number of known
cases brought in the sector is 47; 42 cases brought under
investment treaties and five under investment contracts.
For further statistics on investor–state claims in respect
of agricultural investments, see pages 5-6.7
As the number of agricultural investments increases, or
as existing investments move into implementation
phases, the number of known investor–state claims will
likely increase. A study conducted in 2015 found that a
majority of large-scale agribusiness investments initiated
in low and middle-income countries since 2000 were
protected by at least one investment treaty.8 This creates
at least the potential for investor–state claims arising from
such investments to increase in the future. This potential
may be heightened by the reportedly rising total number
of failed agribusiness projects: between 2007 and 2017,
at least 135 such projects were reported to have failed.9

Agricultural landscape.

4.

Convention on the settlement of investment Disputes between states and nationals
of other states (iCsiD Convention), entered into force on October 14, 1966. As of October
1, 2018, 154 states had ratified the iCsiD Convention. see iCsiD, ICSID Convention,
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/iCsiD-Convention.aspx>.

5.

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (new
York Convention), entered into force on June 7, 1959. As of October 1, 2018, 159
states were party to the new York Convention. see unCiTRAl, Status: Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/nYConvention_status.html>.

6.

lorenzo Cotula and Thierry Berger, “land Deals and investment Treaties: visualizing
the interface” (international institute for Environment and Development, 2015), p.
14 <http://pubs.iied.org/12586iiED/>.

4 |

CCSI/IIED/IISD

7.

The infographics at p. 5 and cases listed in Table 1 reflect (i) treaty and contract
cases tagged as “Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry” in the iCsiD case database
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/Advancedsearch.aspx - last accessed July
19, 2018); and (ii) treaty cases tagged as “Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing” in the unCTAD
case database (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/isDs/FilterByEconomicsector last accessed July 19, 2018). The Table and related infographics included in this briefing
note do not include all investor-state claims concerning secondary agricultural industries
(e.g., those tagged as cases relating to “manufacture of food products” or “manufacture
of beverages” in the unCTAD case database). As noted in the text below, these cases can
impact governments’ use of “downstream” policies that may be designed to support
certain types of “upstream” agricultural operations (such as small-scale domestic farms).

8.

Cotula and Berger (n 6).

9.

gRAin, “Failed Farmland Deals: A growing legacy of Disaster and Pain” (June 2018)
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5958-failed-farmland-deals-a-growinglegacy-of-disaster-and-pain>.
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ISDS CASES IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING
TOTAL
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* Treaty and contract cases tagged as ‘Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry’ in the ICSID case database https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx - last accessed 19 July 2018; and treaty
cases tagged as ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing’ in the UNCTAD case database http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByEconomicSector - last accessed 19 July 2018.
Other source: Italaw - https://www.italaw.com/ - last accessed 19 July 2018.
Source: international institute for sustainable Development (iisD)
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ISDS CASES IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING
D E V ELOP ED COUN T RIES
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Situation and Prospects' 2018.
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Source: international institute for sustainable Development (iisD)
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EXAMPLES OF MEASURES CHALLENGED IN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATIONS
CONCERNING AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS
»

Termination of a lease agreement (e.g., Grot and others v. Moldova; Almås v. Poland; Inicia and
others v. Hungary);

»

Cancellation of an investment project (e.g., Agro EcoEnergy and others v. Tanzania; Africom
Commodities Pty Ltd v the Democratic Republic of Congo);

»

Denial of tax exemptions and other financial benefits (e.g., Longyear v. Canada; Albacora v.
Ecuador; Champion Trading and Ameritrade v. Egypt);

»

Import bans intended to protect animal health (e.g., Canadian Cattlemen v. USA);

»

Reduction, cancellation, or changes to allocation of fishing quotas (e.g., Besserglik v.
Mozambique; Greiner v. Canada; Vieira v. Chile);

»

National courts’ refusal to enforce arbitral awards under a private commercial contract
(e.g., Romak v. Uzbekistan; Western NIS v. Ukraine);

»

Claims arising out of countervailing duties and antidumping measures (e.g., Tembec v. USA;
Terminal Forest v. USA; Canfor v. USA);

»

Alleged failure to enforce laws for the protection of private property (e.g., Quadrant Pacific v.
Costa Rica; Olguin v. Paraguay);

»

Seizure of property in the context of land reform (von Pezold and others v. Zimbabwe; Funnekotter
v. Zimbabwe; Border Timbers and others v. Zimbabwe); and

»

Nationalization (Western African Aquaculture Ltd, Kurt Lennart Hansson and Martje Bolt Hansson v.
Republic of The Gambia; Longreef v. Venezuela).

Agricultural crops below
the u-Bein teak bridge
in mandalay, myanmar.
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WHAT IMPACT CAN INVESTMENT
TREATIES HAVE?
Obligations established by investment treaties and
enforced by investor–state arbitration can have profound
implications for state parties, investment-affected
rights holders and the general public interest.
These obligations can restrict the host state’s ability to
regulate investment in agriculture by effectively precluding
the adoption of new laws or regulations and judicial or
administrative decisions. This can include measures
concerning: meaningful consultation with (and participation)
of affected communities in decision making regarding
investments; protection of the environment, including water
sources; and the carrying out of environmental and social or
human rights impact assessments. investment treaties may
limit use of government subsidies or taxes to support
domestic producers and can bar restrictions on exports
aimed to promote domestic food security.
Where a host state’s measures negatively impact an
investor’s operations, that investor may make a number
of claims at investor–state arbitration. The investor may
claim that its investment was indirectly expropriated, or
that the host state violated its obligation to provide fair
and equitable treatment by undermining the investor’s
“legitimate expectations” with respect to its investment.
The investor could also claim that the measures treated
it less favourably than other similar investors of different
nationalities, or that the measures violated the treaty’s
rules against performance requirements.
investment treaties may also restrict the ability of host
states to renegotiate investor–state contracts: tribunals
have faulted governments for seeking alteration of
previously agreed terms when circumstances surrounding
investment deals had fundamentally changed, and for
10.

For examples of cases relevant to other sectors, see e.g., PSEG Global Inc. and Konya
Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, iCsiD Case no.
ARB/02/5, Award (January 19, 2007); Hochtief AG v. The Argentine Republic, iCsiD
Case no. ARB/07/31, Decision on liability (December 29, 2014); EDF International
S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, iCsiD Case no. ARB/03/23, Award (June 11, 2012); National Grid plc v. The
Argentine Republic, unCiTRAl, Award (november 3, 2008).

11.

lorenzo Cotula, “land Rights and investment Treaties: Exploring the interface”
(international institute for Environment and Development 2015), pp. 31-33
<http://pubs.iied.org/12578iiED/>.

12.

ibid (n 11), pp. 19-20.
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failing to adequately respond to investors’ similar efforts
to renegotiate their contracts.10 These treaties could also
require a host state to compensate an investor for
cancelling an illegal investment or voiding a contract that
was entered into through an act that was beyond the host
government’s power or authority11 or in violation of
international norms and standards.12
investment treaties may impede government efforts or
policies aiming to ensure that agricultural contracts
between private parties are fair and balanced. Consider,
for instance, if a court determined that the terms in an
agreement between a foreign investor and domestic
business were unenforceable because they were
impermissibly unbalanced, asymmetrical or unjust.
That court decision could be the subject of an
investment treaty claim by the foreign buyer.
investment treaties can create state obligations that
compete with obligations under domestic law and other
bodies of international law, including human rights law.13
While international investment law and international
human rights law do not inherently conflict with one
another, the obligations arising from these regimes can
directly clash. This requires a state to choose between
fulfilling one obligation, or another, or one obligation
may limit the policy space required by the state to
comply with another obligation.14
investment treaties can hinder government use of
“downstream” policies, such as taxes, incentives or
regulations applied to food manufacturers that purchase
agricultural inputs. These types of policies may be designed
to support certain types of “upstream” agricultural
operations (such as small-scale domestic farms) or
processes (such as organic farming), but may have negative
impacts on “downstream” manufacturers. While not
encompassed within data on agricultural investor–state
13.

For further discussion of competing obligations that can arise in the context of
international investment, see Kaitlin Y. Cordes, lise Johnson, and sam szoke-Burke,
“land Deal Dilemmas: grievances, Human Rights, and investor Protections”
(Columbia Center on sustainable investment, 2016)
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2016/03/10/land-deal-dilemmas-grievances-humanrights-and-investor-protections/>.

14.

see Jesse Coleman, Kaitlin Cordes, and lise Johnson, “Human Rights law and the
investment Treaty Regime” in Research Handbook on Human Rights and Business
(forthcoming 2019); lorenzo Cotula, “Rethinking investment Treaties to Advance
Human Rights” (international institute for Environment and Development, 2016),
<http://pubs.iied.org/17376iiED/>.
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INVESTMENT TREATIES AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE
AND FOOD SYSTEMS
The Committee on World Food Security’s Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and
Food Systems (CFs-RAi) provide guidance to stakeholders, and in particular to policy-makers, on how to
establish an enabling environment that promotes responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.
Endorsed by the CFs in 2014, their core objective “is to promote responsible investment in agriculture
and food systems that contribute to food security and nutrition, thus supporting the progressive realization
of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security.”15
The CFs-RAi highlights key principles that should inform the development of policy and legal frameworks
designed to enable and govern responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. The principles
address a range of issues, including: (i) safeguarding of legitimate tenure rights; (ii) strengthening of
opportunities for small-scale producers to benefit from investment; (iii) promotion of meaningful
participation of all relevant stakeholders in decision making regarding investments, and in policy-making;
and (iv) establishing of mechanisms for impact assessments. To implement the CFs-RAi, states should apply
the principles throughout the development, adaptation and implementation of relevant policies and laws.16
implementing the CFs-RAi implies changes to existing policies and laws, or adoption of new policies and
laws, applicable to investment in agriculture and food systems. The level of policy space required to
make these changes can, however, be constrained by investment treaty obligations. Changes in existing
laws, or adoption of new laws, may give rise to alleged breaches of investor–state contracts or investment
treaties: publicly known investor–state claims have, for example, been lodged regarding changes to
environmental laws, royalty levels and zoning laws applicable to investments.17 Due to vague standards
enshrined in most treaties currently in force, and the discretion afforded to investment tribunals, it is often
difficult to assess with certainty in advance of adopting a new measure whether that measure will be
considered a breach of treaty obligations.18 moreover, if an investor–state contract includes a stabilization
clause,19 this can further expose host states to liability for exercise of normal regulatory powers regarding
agricultural and other types of investment.20
For these and other reasons, the CFs-RAi themselves underscore the importance of protecting domestic
policy space when considering conclusion of investment treaties and investor–state contracts.21

15.

Committee on World Food security, Principles for Responsible investment in
Agriculture and Food systems (2014), para. 10 <http://www.fao.org/3/a-au866e.pdf>.

16.

see e.g., CFs-RAi (n 15), para. 36.

17.

Carin smaller and Howard mann, “A Thirst for Distant lands: Foreign investment in
Agricultural land and Water” (international institute for sustainable Development
2009), p. 17 < https://www.iisd.org/library/thirst-distant-lands-foreign-investmentagricultural-land-and-water>.

18.

smaller and mann (n 17), p. 17.

19.

For examples of investor-state contracts for agricultural, forestry, and other landbased investments containing stabilization clauses, see OpenlandContracts.org
https://openlandcontracts.org/search?q=&annotation_category%5B%5D=stabilization.

20.

smaller and mann (n 17), p. 18.

21.

CFs-RAi (n 15), para. 33, provides, for example, that “[s]tates should maintain
adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when
pursuing business-related policy objectives with other states or business
enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts,”.

CCSI/IIED/IISD
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disputes concerning primary industries, these types of
cases related to food manufacturing can nevertheless have
important implications for agricultural policies.22
By enabling enforcement of investment treaty obligations
through investor–state arbitration, states can attract

significant financial liability for treaty violations. Even the
threat of being faced with having to pay the legal fees and
sizeable awards may be sufficient to pressure a host state
to abandon new laws or policies aimed at promoting
more responsible, sustainable investment in agriculture.

INVESTMENT TREATIES AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in
the Context of National Food Security (vggT) provide guidance to policy-makers and other stakeholders
on the responsible governance of tenure. Endorsed by the CFs in 2012, their overarching goal is to achieve
food security and support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of
national food security.
The vggT set out principles for the responsible governance of tenure, including guidance on land tenure reform.
A core component of the vggT is the safeguarding and legal protection of all “legitimate tenure rights,” including
customary rights that may not be documented or legally recognized.23 The vggT also reinforce existing
obligations regarding the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands and natural resources.24
some states are now seeking to align their national legal frameworks with the vggT. in undertaking land
tenure reform, foreign investors or their investments may be affected. land tenure reform can, for example,
require adjustment of compensation requirements applicable to expropriations for investment projects,
or alter the nature of land rights held by investors already operating in a host state or seeking to establish
an investment in that state.25 in these and other ways, investment treaties may enable investors to
challenge measures adopted in good faith to align national frameworks with best practice regarding good
governance of tenure, or may restrict the reforms states can confidently pursue without attracting liability.
implementation of the vggT also requires states to provide access to justice for infringement of legitimate
tenure rights and resolution of tenure disputes where they arise.26 Obligations that arise from investment
treaties, enforceable through investor–state arbitration, can create tensions between the rights of
legitimate tenure holders and investor protections. Where investors are not open to adjusting their
operations, addressing the land grievances of legitimate tenure holders may expose a state to liability
under an investment treaty.27 Due to the costly nature of investor–state arbitration (even in cases where
a state successfully defends itself against the claim), the state may be inclined to resolve the dispute in
favour of investor interests to the detriment of legitimate tenure rights holders.

22.

23.

10 |

see e.g., Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States, iCsiD Case no. ARB(AF)/05/2
(2005) (challenging adoption of a tax on beverages containing high fructose corn
syrup); Cargill, Incorporated v. Republic of Poland, iCsiD Case no. ARB(AF)/04/2 (2004)
(challenging imposition of quotas on a sweetener); Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co
KG v. Republic of Ghana, iCsiD Case no. ARB/07/24 (2007) (concerning alleged
breaches of a joint venture agreement to renovate a cocoa bean processing factory).

24.

see e.g., vggT (n 23), paras. 7.3, 9.1-9.12.

25.

Cotula (n 11), p. 19-20.

26.

see e.g., vggT (n 23), paras. 3A, 7.3, 21.

see e.g., Food and Agriculture Organization of the united nations and Committee on World
Food security, voluntary guidelines on the Responsible governance of Tenure of land,

27.

Cordes, Johnson, and szoke-Burke (n 13).

CCSI/IIED/IISD

Fisheries and Forests in the Context of national Food security (2012) paras. 3A, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3,
7.1-7.6, 8.2, 10.1-10.6, 12.4, 12.6 <http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf>.
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DOES INVESTOR–STATE
ARBITRATION PROPERLY CONSIDER
LOCAL PERSPECTIVES?
While investor–state arbitration focuses on the bilateral
relationship between the investor and the state, many
investments in agricultural sectors affect a much wider
range of actors. This includes people whose land and
resource rights are expropriated in or around the project
area, and people adversely affected by the
environmental impacts of the project (e.g., pollution,
water abstraction). in many cases, action by these groups
is at the root of the investor–state dispute, for example
where the arbitration claim challenges: i) measures that
public authorities took in response to pressure from local
groups, or ii) the inability of those authorities to protect
the investment against local protests or occupations.28
Over the years, reforms to investor–state arbitration have
created new opportunities for local groups to bring

issues to the attention of the arbitral tribunal, particularly
by seeking the tribunal’s authorization to make “amicus
curiae” (“friend of the court”) submissions. such
submissions generally aim to provide a different
perspective from the ones advanced by the investor and
the state. However, even when tribunals have accepted
such submissions, their influence on the outcome of
arbitrations has tended to be limited.29 in agriculture,
where investment-related disputes often involve tensions
linked to the local impacts of investments, the narrow
investor–state framing of dispute settlement creates real
challenges in ensuring that all relevant rights are properly
considered. moreover, investment treaties and investor–
state arbitration can undermine access to justice
pursued by local groups in other fora.30 in one recent
case, for example, an investor sought and obtained an
award requiring the state to shield it from liability for
environmental harms caused by its investment and to
prevent enforcement of a domestic award obtained by
local communities regarding those harms.31

local women fishing in morondava, Western madagascar.

28.

see lorenzo Cotula and mika schröder, “Community Perspectives in investor-state
Arbitration” (international institute for Environment and Development, 2017),
<http://pubs.iied.org/12603iiED/>.

29.

ibid (n 28).

30.

For a discussion of these issues, see “impacts of the international investment
Regime on Access to Justice: Roundtable Outcome Document (Columbia Center

on sustainable investment and un Working group on Business and Human Rights,
2018) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/09/27/ccsi-and-unwgbhr-internationalinvestment-regime-and-access-to-justice/>.
31.

Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company and The Republic of Ecuador
(II), PCA Case no. 2009-23, second Partial Award on Track ii (August 30, 2018), paras.
9.22, 9.24.

CCSI/IIED/IISD

| 11

BRIEFING

INVESTMENT TREATIES AND RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT
Due to the profound influence and impact of businesses on local lives and livelihoods, emphasis is
increasingly placed on the responsibilities and, depending on the applicable laws, obligations of
businesses to behave responsibly in the context of international investment. The link between responsible
business conduct and the viability of investments is also being increasingly recognized by a broader group
of stakeholders. As investors and financing institutions recognize that failure to conduct business
responsibly brings material risk, greater emphasis is placed on implementing best practices for
responsible business conduct.
most investment treaties do not require investors to comply with minimum standards of responsible
conduct in order to benefit from legal protections and remedies.32 in fact, investor protections enshrined
in investment treaties—and interpreted and applied by investment tribunals—can send the wrong signals
to investors and host states regarding responsible business conduct. investment tribunals have
interpreted and applied investment treaty standards to, in some cases, reward investors who ignore
potential or actual risks associated with investments rather than conduct robust due diligence. By insuring
investors against the risk of inadequate due diligence, and incentivizing investors to proceed without
meeting their responsibilities (or in some cases obligations), the investment treaty regime undermines
efforts to advance responsible and sustainable investment.33

Oil palm plantation
in malaysia.

32.

lorenzo Cotula, “Raising the Bar on Responsible investment: What Role for
investment Treaties?” (international institute for Environment and Development,
2018) <http://pubs.iied.org/17454iiED/>.

33.

see Kaitlin Cordes and lise Johnson, “sending mixed signals: Responsible Business
Conduct and investment Treaties” (Columbia Center on sustainable investment,
forthcoming 2019).
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34.

see e.g., lise Johnson, lisa sachs, Brooke güven and Jesse Coleman, “Costs and
Benefits of investment Treaties: Practical Considerations for states” (Columbia Center
on sustainable investment, march 2018) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/04/20/costsbenefits-iias/>; Joachim Pohl, “societal Benefits and Costs of international
investment Agreements: A Critical Review of Aspects and Available Empirical
Evidence” (OECD Working Papers on international investment, no. 2018/1)
<https://doi.org/10.1787/e5f85c3d-en>; Jonathan Bonnitcha, “Assessing the
impacts of investment Treaties: Overview of the evidence” (international institute
for sustainable Development, september 2017)
<https://www.iisd.org /sites/default/files/publications/assessing-impactsinvestment-treaties.pdf>.
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HOW CAN POLICY-MAKERS
ADDRESS THESE CHALLENGES?
As the costs associated with investment treaties—and
investor–state arbitration in particular—are increasingly
realized, policy-makers are exploring a spectrum of
revised approaches to international investment
governance. The specific options available to policymakers will vary depending on the policy objectives and
individual circumstances of the state.

If considering new treaties:
»

Create space for meaningful public consultation
and participation in investment policy processes.
This should include defining and assessing policy
objectives and priorities for international
investment, and determining whether concluding
new treaties is an appropriate means of meeting
those objectives.37

»

if entering into negotiations for new investment
treaties is considered the most appropriate
mechanism for meeting policy objectives: i) assess
the provisions, protections and obligations that
should be included in new treaties on the basis of
sustainable development objectives; and ii)
develop a model on the basis of this assessment
that can be used during negotiations.

»

Reinforce state commitments to responsible
investment within the texts of new treaties by, for
example, committing state parties to implementing
the CFs-RAi and vggT.38

»

Consider integrating binding investor obligations
within the texts of investment treaties.39 These
obligations should at a minimum make treaty
protection contingent on compliance with
domestic law. They could also require compliance
with standards relevant to responsible investment,
including the OECD guidelines for multinational
Enterprises40 and the un guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights.41

In general, policy-makers should:
»

Carefully assess the costs and benefits associated
with investment treaties, and consider whether
those costs and benefits are fairly distributed.34

»

Consider whether investment treaties provide the
best way to realize priorities concerning responsible
investment in agriculture and sustainable
development objectives.

»

Engage in reform processes regarding investor–
state arbitration, including discussions taking place
at the united nations Commission on international
Trade law (unCiTRAl)35 and at iCsiD.36

»

Enhance the capacity of policy-makers, negotiators
and those involved in reform discussions.

»

Create greater awareness of the implications of
investment treaties among other policy-makers
whose responsibilities are affected by, or should
inform, investment policy.

»

Establish processes that promote transparent and
meaningful participation of all relevant
stakeholders in the formulation of investment
policy and dialogue on reform of the international
investment regime.

35.

see unCiTRAl, Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3investor_state.html.

40.

OECD guidelines for multinational Enterprises
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/>.

36.

see iCsiD, ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment Process
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments>.

41.

37.

see Johnson, sachs, güven and Coleman (n 34), p. 18.

un guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: implementing the united
nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/guidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_En.pdf>.

38.

see Cotula (n 11), p. 47.

42.

see Johnson, sachs, güven and Coleman (n 34), p. 17.

39.

see e.g., “integrating investor Obligations and Corporate Accountability Provisions
in Trade and investment Agreements” (international institute for sustainable
Development, January 2018); Cotula (n 32).
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With respect to existing treaties:
»

»

Establish a multistakeholder review process to take
stock of existing treaties and evaluate whether and
how they might undermine sustainable
development objectives, including regarding
investment in agriculture.42 This review process
should also consider how obligations under existing
treaties align with or impact obligations under
domestic law and other bodies of international law.
On the basis of this review and the costs and benefits
associated with existing treaties, assess whether
existing treaties should be terminated or renegotiated.

»

Where the review process indicates that
agreements should be terminated, consider
options for withdrawal of consent to investor-state
arbitration and joint termination of
investment treaties.43

»

Clarify the scope of vague, far-reaching treaty
provisions by adopting unilateral or joint
interpretative statements.

These recommendations are not exhaustive. They
highlight some of the steps that can be taken by policymakers seeking to better understand and address
the implications of investment treaties for the range of
policy objectives, priorities and stakeholders affected
by these agreements.

Collecting drinking water from wells in lalitpur city,
Katmandu, nepal.

43.
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see e.g., lise Johnson, lisa sachs, Brooke güven and Jesse Coleman, “Clearing the
Path: Withdrawal of Consent and Termination as next steps for Reforming international
investment law” (Columbia Center on sustainable investment, April 2018)
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/04/24/clearing-the-path-withdrawal-of-consent-andtermination-as-next-steps-for-reforming-international-investment-law/>.
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TABLE 1: ISDS CASES IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING - AS AT 19 JULY 2018*

Year

Country

Claimant

Claim Value
(usD)

Outcome

Award
(usD)

Sub-sector

Commodity

Case
type

Home
country

Host
country

Rules

2018

The gambia

Western
African
Aquaculture
ltd

30,000,000

Pending

n/a

Fishing

Fish

Contract

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2018

DRC

Africom
Commodities
Pty ltd

20,000,000

Pending

unknown

Agroprocessing

unknown

Treaty

Developing

Developing

-

2018

serbia

Rand
investments
ltd. & others

unknown

Pending

n/a

Agroprocessing

unknown

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2017

Tanzania

Agro
EcoEnergy
& others

500,000,000

Pending

n/a

Food crops;
biofuels

sugar

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2017

Hungary

inicia & others

unknown

Pending

n/a

Dairy; food
crops

Dairy & crop

Treaty

Developed

Developed

iCsiD

2016

moldova

grot & others

10,000,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

400,000

Food crops

various Crops

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2016

venezuela

Agroinsumos
iberoAmericanos
& ors

unknown

Pending

n/a

Agricultural
inputs

Farm inputs

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2016

Ecuador

Albacora

20,000,000

Pending

n/a

Fishing

Fish

Treaty

Developed

Developing

unCiTRAl

2016

Egpyt

Champion
Holding
Company &
others

100,000,000

Pending

n/a

non-food
crops

Cotton

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2016

indonesia

Oleovest Pte.
ltd

unknown

Discontinued
or settled

n/a

non-food
crops

Edible Oils

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2014

mozambique

Besserglik

91,000,000

Pending

n/a

Fishing

Fish

Treaty

Developing

Developing

iCsiD AF

2014

Canada

longyear

12,000,000

Discontinued
or settled

unknown

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2013

Poland

Almås

24,800,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Dairy; food
crops

Dairy & crop

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2013

venezuela

valores
mundiales,
s.l. &
Consorcio
Andino s.l.

unknown

Decided in
favour of
investor

430,000,000

Agroprocessing

grain

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2012

Croatia

georg
gavrilovic &
gavrilovic
d.o.o.

210,600,000

Pending

n/a

Agroprocessing

Cattle

Treaty

Developed

Developed

iCsiD

2011

Poland

vincent J.
Ryan,
schooner
Capital llC,
and Atlantic
investment
Partners llC

unknown

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Agroprocessing

Edible Oils

Treaty

Developed

Developed

iCsiD AF

* The cases listed in Table 1 reflect (i) treaty and contract cases tagged as “Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry” in the ICSID case database (https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx
- last accessed July 19, 2018); and (ii) treaty cases tagged as “Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing” in the UNCTAD case database (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByEconomicSector last accessed July 19, 2018). The Table and related Infographics included in this briefing note do not include all investor-state claims concerning secondary agricultural industries (e.g. those tagged
as cases relating to “Manufacture of food products” or “Manufacture of beverages” in the UNCTAD case database).
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TABLE 1: ISDS CASES IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING - AS AT 19 JULY 2018

- COnTinuED

Year

Country

Claimant

Claim Value
(usD)

Outcome

Award
(usD)

Sub-sector

Commodity

Case
type

Home
country

Host
country

Rules

2011

venezuela

longreef
investments
A.v.v.

500,000,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

43,000,000

non-food
crops

Coffee

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2010

Zimbabwe

von Pezold
& ors

unknown

Decided in
favour of
investor

65,000,000

Food crops;
non-food
crops

nuts

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2010

Zimbabwe

Border
Timbers &
others

unknown

Decided in
favour of
investor

unknown

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2010

Rwanda

Olyana
Holdings llC

unknown

Discontinued
or settled

unknown

non-food
crops

Tea

Contract

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2010

Canada

greiner

8,000,000

Discontinued
or settled

unknown

Fishing

Fish

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2010

Turkmenistan

Bozbey

60,000,000

Discontinued
or settled

n/a

Agroprocessing

unknown

Treaty

Developing

Developing

unCiTRAl

2010

Canada

AbitibiBowater
inc

535,000,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

130,050,000

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2009

Turkmenistan

Dogan

45,000,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

n/a

Poultry

Poultry

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2009

ukraine

global
Trading

35,000,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Poultry

Poultry

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2008

Czech
Republic

interTrade

105,500,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2008

Costa Rica

Quadrant
Pacific

20,000,000

Discontinued
or settled

n/a

Food crops

Fruit

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2007

CAR

shareholders
of sEsAm

unknown

unknown

unknown

Forestry

Forest products

Contract

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2006

Canada

merrill & Ring

51,200,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

iCsiD

2006

venezuela

vestey

157,400,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

98,100,000

livestock

Cattle

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2006

uzbekistan

Romak

10,000,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Food crops

grain

Treaty

Developed

Developing

unCiTRAl

2005

Zimbabwe

Bernardus
Henricus
Funnekotter
& ors

15,600,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

10,600,000

various

various Crops

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2005

us

Canadian
Cattlemen

235,000,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

livestock

Cattle

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2005

mexico

Bayview

667,600,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Agricultural
inputs

Farm inputs

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD AF

2004

Chile

sociedad
Anónima
Eduardo vieira

22,000,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Fishing

Fish

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD
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TABLE 1: ISDS CASES IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING - AS AT 19 JULY 2018

- COnTinuED

Year

Country

Claimant

Claim Value
(usD)

Outcome

Award
(usD)

Sub-sector

Commodity

Case
type

Home
country

Host
country

Rules

2004

us

Tembec

200,000,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

242,000,000

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2004

us

Terminal
Forest

90,000,000

Discontinued
or settled

unknown

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2004

ukraine

Western nis
Enterprise
Fund

unknown

Discontinued
or settled

unknown

Agroprocessing

Edible Oils

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2002

mexico

gAmi

27,800,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Food crops

sugar

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2002

us

Canfor

250,000,000

Discontinued
or settled

unknown

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

unCiTRAl

2002

Egpyt

Champion
Trading and
Ameritrade

365,000,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

non-food
crops

Cotton

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

2001

guyana

Booker

9,900,000

Discontinued
or settled

n/a

Food crops

sugar

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

1999

Canada

Pope &
Talbot

507,500,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

460,000

Forestry

Forest products

Treaty

Developed

Developed

iCsiD

1998

Paraguay

Eudoro A.
Olguín

1,300,000

Decided in
favour of state

n/a

Agroprocessing

grain

Treaty

Developing

Developing

iCsiD

1987

sri lanka

AAPl

8,000,000

Decided in
favour of
investor

460,000

Fishing

Fish

Treaty

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

1984

liberia

liberian
Eastern
Timber
Corporation

unknown

Decided in
favour of
investor

8,750,286

Forestry

Forest products

Contract

Developing

Developing

iCsiD

1984

guinea

Atlantic
Triton
Company
limited

unknown

Decided in
favour of
investor

unknown

Fishing

Fish

Contract

Developed

Developing

iCsiD

Oil palm plantation
in goa, india.
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GLOSSARY
This glossary defines key terms used in the briefing note, or generally relevant to understanding international investment treaties
and investor–state arbitration.
1. Asset-based definition of investment: This type of definition often allows for any type of asset owned or controlled by a
covered investor to fall within the treaty’s scope of protection. Asset-based definitions can also include exhaustive or
illustrative lists of items that qualify as covered investments under the relevant treaty, alongside characteristics of covered
investments.
2. Enterprise-based definition of investment: This type of definition allows for protection of investments that constitute an
enterprise. it can therefore exclude certain assets, and so is more closely aligned with the notion of a foreign direct investment,
which typically requires acquisition of a lasting interest in the host state.44
3. Expropriation: investment treaties commonly establish conditions for the lawfulness of expropriation, or “takings” of
property. Direct expropriation generally involves physical confiscation, nationalization or another form of transfer of
ownership to the state. indirect expropriation refers to acts or measures that deprive the investor from enjoying actual or
expected benefits of an investment. Treaties often state that if a government expropriates an investor’s property, or adopts
measures that have the effect of an expropriation, the state must fully, fairly and promptly compensate the investor.
4. Fair and equitable treatment (FET): This vague standard has been subject to different interpretations that range along a
spectrum of stringency. some tribunals have interpreted the standard relatively narrowly, determining that only conduct
that is egregious and shocking will breach the obligation to accord FET. Others have applied a far higher standard that requires
host states not to undermine the “legitimate expectations” of an investor with respect to its investment. The FET obligation
has been relied upon extensively by investors to challenge a range of host state acts and omissions.
5. Full protection and security (FPS): This obligation requires host states to protect covered investors and their investments
from harm or damage. According to some tribunals, this entails an obligation to provide only protection against physical
harm (e.g., destruction of buildings and property). Other tribunals have interpreted it more broadly, concluding that it also
requires protection against harm caused by changes in the law or government policies.
6. Non-discrimination: most investment treaties require host states not to discriminate: i) between foreign and domestic
investments (“national treatment” obligation); and ii) among foreign investors from different home countries (“most-favoured
nation,” or mFn, obligation). mFn has been interpreted as allowing investors to “cherry-pick” more favourable commitments
or procedural rules from other treaties, resulting in an unintended multilateralization of treaties intended to be bilateral only.
7. Pre- and post-establishment phases: investment treaties can require application of relevant obligations during both the
pre-establishment phase (i.e., the phase during which an investor makes, or seeks to make, an investment) and the postestablishment phase (i.e., the phase during which an investor implements its project or begins operations).
8. Umbrella clause: An umbrella clause is an investment treaty provision that requires the host state to comply with
commitments or obligations owed to covered investors and their investments. Depending on the specific provision and how
it is interpreted, umbrella clauses can be used to enforce contractual commitments made by states, or even obligations the
state has assumed under its general laws.
9. Restrictions on performance requirements: Certain investment treaties restrict or entirely prohibit the introduction and/or
enforcement of performance requirements, which are conditions “that investors must meet in order to establish or operate
a business, or to obtain some advantage offered by the host state.”45 Performance requirements can be used to strengthen
linkages between a foreign investment and the domestic or local economy.46

44.
45.
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unCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), <https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DiAE/ForeignDirect-investment-(FDi).aspx>.
nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Aaron Cosbey, lise Johnson, Damon vis Dunbar,
“investment Treaties and Why They matter to sustainable Development: Questions
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46.

& Answers” (international institution for sustainable Development, 2012), p. 27
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/investment_treaties_why_they_matter_sd.pdf>.
lise Johnson and Jesse Coleman, “international investment law and the Extractive
industries sector” (Columbia Center on sustainable investment, January 2016), p. 5.
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